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Criminality: The Phenomenology 
of Treason in Macbeth 
If, as I suggested at the end of the previous chap ter, relationality is a key 
concept in Shakespeare's treatment of law and selfhood, then Macbeth 
stands as a particularly important case study. The famous dagger scene in 
act 2.1 is unique within the canon. In no other play by Shakespeare does 
the idea of an encounter between a person and a thing carry such high 
political, moral, and legal stakes, and nowhere else does it come wrapped 
in such basic philosophical questions about the relationship between cer-
tainty and perception as well as intention and action. 
Macbeth's dagger experience, its legal-historical sources and philo -
sophical effects within the theater, is the focus of this chapter . I want to 
open, though, by considering a rather different scene, one from Steven 
Spielberg's 2002 science fiction film, Minority Report, loosely based on 
a short story by Philip K. Dick.' The film takes place in the futur e and 
centers on the Washington, D.C., Police Department's "Pre-Crime Unit." 
True to its name, Pre-Crime is responsible for stopping misdeeds, murder s 
in particular, before they happen. The unit is dependent on a complex 
computer system linked to three adult psychics, called "precogs," who 
can predict intentiona l killings shortly before they take place . The task 
of Pre-Crime agents is then to rush to the scene of the crime and arrest 
the murderer (or pre-murderer?) in that critical temporal space betwe en 
intent and act. 
The opening sequence shows agent John Anderton (played by Tom 
Cruise) deciphering the precogs' vision of a husband unwittingly walking 
in on his wife and her lover and then stabbing his wife to death in a fit 
of jealous rage. In the next shot, Pre-Crime helicopters descend onto the 
couple's quiet Georgetown street and agents rush into the house just as 
the husband discovers the infidelity. They promptly fit him with a "halo," 
a device that will place him in a state of suspended animation unti l the 
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term of his sentence expires. In the brief spa n of time between the arrest 
and the haloin g, wife and husband burst into panicked tears, both insist -
ing that he would never kill her. It' s a disturbin g scene made all the mor e 
troublin g by rhe revelation later in the film of the existence of a "minority 
report," a secret document det a iling rare instances in which the precog s 
were wrong. 
Minority Report has many flaws, but it neverth eless manages to raise a 
series of compe lling lega l and philosophical questions. Do es a crime begin 
at the moment of conception or th e mom ent of performance? At what 
point in the progress from thou ght to act do we become legally culpable? 
To wh at degr ee do int entions determine actions? And if we decide that 
intent should affect an individual 's degree of liability for an act, or mor e 
radically , that the conception of a wron g is equivalent to its perfo rman ce, 
how reliable are our methods for determinin g the nawr e of thoughts and 
intention s? Minority Report tak es a conservative and skeptical line on 
these qu estions. We leave the theater unsettled by the film's dystopian 
vision of government thought-police intruding on the last sanctuary of 
priv ate property, the inner world of contemplation. On the other hand , 
most of us agree that there is a meaningful distinction between killing 
with intent (murd er) and killin g without (mans laughter), and we trust 
the co urt s to be able to differentiate between the two in th e majorit y of 
cases. The issue also seems to haunt the ever-grow ing number of mass 
shooting s in the United States at schools, univers ities , movie th eaters, and 
religious institutions. In the aftermath of such events, outrag e at th e lack 
of progress on gun control is often coupled with a desire to see more com-
munic ation between the ment al hea lth sector and law enforc ement. Wh en 
we discover that a shoot er was in thrall to antiso cia l fantasies, or suffered 
from crippl ing PTSD, or harbor ed violently misogy nistic views , we quit e 
naturally wish that these mental attributes cou ld so mehow be po liced. 
On both sides of the issue, there a re fundamental ethical and epistemo-
logica l questions to grapple with: Wh at can we know? How reliably ca n 
we know it? And what respon sib ilities do we ha ve, both to the suspect 
and the public, once that knowled ge is in hand ? 
Like all effective science fiction, Minority Report is troubling because 
the issues it points to do not belong sole ly to a remote wor ld of the future. 
These are abiding legal issues and universa l philosophical problems. We 
recognize them in our own world and Shakespeare wou ld have recognized 
them in his , too. In sixteenth - and seventeenth -century England, ther e was 
more than one way to und erst and the phenomeno logical geog raphy of 
cr ime. William Ho ldswor th, Cynthia B. Herrup, and Richard Firth Green, 
for example, have identified a general shift toward th e mental in early 
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modern criminal law, with the category of mens rea (guilty mind) becorn -
ing crucial for judges and juries attempting to assess degrees of liability .2 
In standard practic e, though, this shift toward the mental remains securely 
anchored to the physical. Mens rea, that is, is meaningful only in refere nce 
to actus reus, a "guilty act." This is neatly illust ra ted by the landm ark 
suicide case of Hales v. Petit (1571). As Edmund Plowden writ es in his 
report, "imagination of the mind to do wrong, without an act don e, is 
not punishable in our law, neither is the resolution to do wrong, which he 
does not, punishable, but the doing of the act is the only point which the 
law regards.'' 3 One is reminded here of Angelo in Measure for Measure 
who instructs, '''Tis on e thing to be tempted, Escalus, I Another thin g to 
fall. ... What's open made to justice, I That justice seizes" (2.1.17-18, 
21- 22 ).4 
The crime that Macbeth commits when he walks offstage at the end 
of act 2.1 is treason, which has its own uniquely vexed legislative and 
intellectual history. From the beginning, treason was defined as a rhou ght -
crime. According to the Edwardian statute of 1352, treason occurs "when 
a man doth compass e or imagine the death of our lord the king ." 5 Subse-
quently , over the course of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuri es, 
the crime was subject to a series of statutory reimaginings, each of which 
attempted to link treason more precisely to a certain kind of act, utt er-
ance, or thought. The resu lt, as I will explain in more detail below, was .1 
cat egory of criminal ity that became remarkably pluralistic and malleable, 
on the one hand a prob lem of the mind and heart with close affinities 
to religious notions of sin, and on the other a singularly consequential 
form of mat er ial intervention in the realm of human affairs. On the ear ly 
modern stage, the act of treason served as both plot devic e and occa -
sion for stage spectacle, but the crime's definitiona l openness also made 
it available to playwrights as an object of theoretical inquiry. Nowhere 
is this more apparent than in the dagger scene in Macbeth in which 
Shakespeare makes the striking decision to give sustained attention to the 
mom ents just before the criminal act when, through the vision of the dag-
ger, Macbeth gradually finds himself able to think the crime he is about 
to do. What we witness in this scene is a theatricalization of the process 
of criminal intent, but also, and more to the point, of criminal int ent as 
process . Compassing treason, in other words, is not reducibl e to static, 
contained thought in the dagger scene . In fact, Macbeth 's crime takes 
shape in pointedly sensual terms. He is concerned with whether or not 
he truly sees the dagger which has mat er ialized in front of him ("ls this 
a dagg er which I see before me" [2.1.33]); he wants to touch it ("come, 
let me clutch thee" [2.1.34]); and when these things prov e problematic 
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he rep laces the visionary dagger with a real one, with "this which now 
I draw" (2.1.41}. Regardless of the ontological status of the dagger that 
triggers Macbeth's speech, by the end of it, treason emerges as something 
that must be experienced physically in order ro be real. 
If this phenomeno log ica l way of thinking about treason is a creative 
response to early modern legal culture, it also const itutes a broader 
reflection on the relat iona l structure of selfhood. Treason for Macbeth is 
someth ing Maurice Merleau-Ponry would have ca lled "a unit of experi-
ence," a multimodal event involving both ideas and things in a way that 
forces us to abandon the mutually exclusive categories of subject and 
objecr .6 Accordingly, like Richard's divestment of property and like Anto-
nio's reckless acceptance of Shylock's contract, Macbeth's encounter with 
the dagger comprises a legal ecology : a jurisprudential scene in which 
selfhood obtains as and thr ough a dynamic process involving other per-
sons or things. I will show how this works in more detail below, but first 
we need to return to the legal and cultural hisrory of treason. Doing so, 
we'll find that some of the conceptua l genome of the dagger scene was 
already conta ined within key acts, statutes, and tria ls of the sixteenth and 
seven teenth century. 
Locat ing Treason in Early Mod ern England 
Let's begin by taking anot her look at the Edward ian statute of 1352 . As 
I mentioned, thi s statu te, which eventually found its way into Edward 
Coke's Institutes ( 1644 ), defined t reason as "when a man doth compasse 
or imagine the death of our lord the king."The key terms are "compasse" 
and "imag ine." T hey enter the English statue as literal translations of the 
original Law French-compasser and imaginer-and occur in no ot her 
legal stature. Their effect within the statute of treason is to cast rea lized 
action as a consequence of a crime that has already taken place in the 
mind. That is, as an effect, which may or may not actua lly be produced . 
Monarchs and judges quickly learned how the category of "imagined 
treason" might be stretched and extended to embrace a wide variety of 
offenses, often having ro do w ith wr itten or spoken words of a purport-
ed ly malicious, or otherwise antimonarchical, nature . Indeed, with the 
except ion of charges aris ing from levying war aga inst the king (something 
not uncommon during the political upheavals ushered in by Richard II), 
"imagined" treachery-treachery planned, spoken of, or alluded to -was 
the dominant source of indictment between the years 1352 and 1485. 7 It's 
on ly with the Tudor period, and in particular the reign of Henry VIII, that 
Crimina lity 83 
we find a concerted effort to define exactly what imagined treason might 
entail. Whereas between 1352 and 1485 ten new treason statutes were 
enacted, the period 1485 to 1602 saw a staggering sixty-eight treason seat-
utes enacted .8 Thi s succession of legislative interventions-what amounts 
to a susta ined dialogue with the origina l Edwardian statute-focused on 
particularizing that vague notion of the "treasonous imagination," testing 
its conceptual boundaries and phenomenologica l struc tu re, and doing so 
in a way that permitted it to be more efficiently mobi lized as a category 
of crirnina liry. 
That Henry VIII's reign is the most significant passage in the history 
of treason in early modern England is in some ways hardly surprising. 
Given Henry's complete overhau l of the established structure of obedi-
ence and obligation, it's only logical that treason, a type of offense whose 
officia l existe nce was largely aimed at safeguarding that structure, would 
receive a similar overhaul. Between the years 1530 and 1542, a series of 
acts intended in the first place to defend Henry's religious policies and 
matrimonia l arrangements resulted in a newly detailed model of the scope 
of treason. Th e first Succession Act (25 Hen. VIII c.22), 9 for instance, 
attempted preemptive ly ro safeguard Henry's marriage to Anne Boleyn by 
making exp licitly treasonous not on ly deeds which imperiled the king, bur 
a lso written or printed words that slandered him or his rnarriage. 10 T his 
met with swift retaliation from Henry's legal advisors who urged, at the 
very least, the demotion of spoken words to the lesser crime of "misprision 
of trea son." They were unsuccessful. Th e 1521 trial of the Duke of Buck-
ingham set precedent against them. At Buckingham's trial, Chief Justice 
Fineux distinguished between felony and treason thus: whereas the former 
a lways required some kind of act to be committed, the latter required 
nothing more than intention to kill the king and this, FineLLX maintained, 
could be sufficiently proven by words alone.1 1 The 1534 Treason Act (26 
Hen. VIII v.13) drove this point home by making "treason by words" 
its foca l point. Moreover, now not only were written and printed words 
deemed treasonous, but spoken words, too-pronouncing the king a here -
tic, a schismatic, a tyrant, an infidel, an adulterer - were taken as definitive 
marks of a traitor, and thi s was reiterated in the second Succession Act (28 
Hen . VIII c.7}. However, the most sensational piece of Henrican treason 
legislation was the act passed in 1541/42 (33 Hen . VIII c.23} dealing with 
women the king int ended to marry. This act stated that if the monarch 
pursued marriage with a woman under the assumption that she was chaste 
and she later proved to be otherwise, she would be found guilty of treason. 
The act is exp licitly concerned with monitoring the body, but it's also con -
cerned with monitoring the mind. A woman indicted under this act is not 
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just guilty of a sexual infraction; she is also guilty of withholding informa-
tion, of having knowledge of a certain state of affairs and not providing 
the authorities with access to that knowledge. Consis tent with this logic, 
under this act, any other subject who happened to know of the woman's 
sexua l status and failed to report it would also be guilty of treason. This is 
a bizarre and despotic piece of legislation, to be sure, at once a testament 
to Henry's own manic single-m indedness and a significa nt landmark in 
the cultura l history of sexua l survei llance . However, the 1541/42 act also 
tells us something important about changes in the metaphysics of crime 
in ear ly modern England. A crime becomes in this act some th ing that can 
take place prior to, or irrespective of, instantiated words or ac tions. It 
constitutes, therefore, an important extension of the territory of treason 
beyond the materialized world into the realm of thoughts themselves. 
Henry YlII is a monarch whose so lutions to immediate political prob-
lems tended to have rather long-term effects, and his treason acts are no 
exception. Edward, Mary, and Elizabeth each oversaw new treason stat-
utes, and eac h wave of legislation had its own characteristics. Bur all three 
reigns are characterized by a more general pattern of opt imistically rolling 
back Henry's punitive legislat ion shortly after ascension on ly to reinstate 
it when the task of govern ing starred to get thorny. 12 As a result, Henri-
can definitions of treason-p inpointing, in turn , written words, spoken 
words, and, fina lly, silent know ledge as po liceable phenomena - came to 
have a formative influence on sixteenth-century notions of treason more 
broadly . The nonphysical forms of the crime signa led implicitly in the 
l 352 statute were made exp licit in the Henr ican acts, transforming the 
cr ime from an enac ted affront to somet hin g that might more accu rately 
be thought of as a psychological terrain-a cognit ive space, from which 
wo rds and actions merely have the potential to issue. 
By the sixteenth century, the mental component of crime had become 
impor tant beyond the pale of treason, too. The distinction between mur-
der and manslaughter, w hich I referred to above, emerges for the first time 
in the sixteenth century, and then as now it turned on whether or not the 
accused intended to kill their vict im. u Later, in the seventeenth century, 
Edward Coke and Matthew Ha le used the concepts of "ma lice prepensed" 
and "malitia praecogitata," respectively, to differentiate among a wide 
range of felonies, includ ing not only various forms of homicide, but also 
burglary, arson, and assau lt .14 At the root of these concepts is the juris-
prudence of Henry de Bracton, the thirteenth-century Englis h jud ge and 
clergyman whose seminal work, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae 
(c. 1235) was first printed in 1569. Bracton deve loped the idea of mens 
rea, arguing that 
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we must consider with what mind lanimo J or with what intent [vol-
untatel a thing is done, in fact or in judgment, in order that it may 
be determined according ly what action should follow and what 
punishment . For to take away the will makes every act indifferent, 
because your state of mind gives meaning to your act, and a crime is 
not committed unless the intent to injure [nocendi voluntas] inter-
vene, nor is a theft committed without the intent to stea l. 15 
8.'i 
Bracton's emphasis on the mental component of crim e is the resu lt of two 
key influences. One is Roman law, which had been undergoing a massive 
resurge nce in Europe since the beginning of the twelfth century. Mens rea 
owes at least a partial debt to the Roman legal concept of dolo malo (evil 
intention), dealt with extensively by Cicero, for example, in Pro Tullio.'" 
The other, much stronger, influence on Bracton was canon law, a system 
of eccles iastically based ru les in which the lack of distinction between 
crime and sin endowed all forms of infraction with a deeply spiritual, 
and therefore interiorized, quality. Eugene Chesney has observed that 
Bracton's work "was replete with ideas borrowed from canon law" and 
Frederic Pollock and Frederick William Maitland point out that Bracton's 
ideas on homicide, in particular, were extracted from a treatise by the 
twe lfth-century canonist and bishop Bernard of Pavia. 17 
H enry's treason legislation shares with the concepts of mens rea, "mal-
ice prepensed," and "malitia praecogitata" a theoretical concern with the 
or igin of crime as well as its effects. This is very different from, say, the 
absolute liability of early medieval criminal law which based sentences 
a lmost excl usively on what Oliver Wendell Holmes called "externals." 1H 
An arrow shot over a barn for fun was an act of homicide if it happened to 
ki ll somebody taking a stroll on the other side. All that mattered was the 
outcome . Yet it remains the case that treasons which pro duced outwardly 
manifested evidence were much easier to prove . The successful prosecution 
of imagined treason frequently involved creating such evidence. Written or 
spoken words, witness testimony, even the suspect's body cou ld be taken 
as indicators of a fully fo rmed mental plot to harm or betray the monarch. 
A major piece of evidence used against Katherine Howard in 1542, for 
example, was a mark on her body. The trial of Mary, Q ueen of Scots in 
1586, on the other hand, turned on the authenticity of an encrypted group 
of letters. And at Sir Walter Raleigh's 1603 treason trial, a great deal of 
importance was placed on things he was purported to have said. 19 
Sometimes, though, it was the absence of language or action that ended 
up being the most damning piece of evidence since silence and withdrawal 
cou ld so easily be connected to secrecy, scheming, and malevolence in the 
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period. This was certain ly the case at the trial of H enry Cuffe in 1601, 
as it was at the much mor e famous tri al of Thomas More in 1535. At 
More 's trial , the king 's attorney general, Christopher Hales, asserted in no 
uncertain terms, "Even though we should have no word or deed to charge 
upon yo u, yet we have your silence, and th at is sign of your evil intention 
and sure proof of yo ur mali ce."20 The link between silence and disob e-
dience in the early modern per iod emerges in large part our of anxiety 
abo ut religious dissimulation , an issue that was intensifi ed by the terms of 
the Elizabethan religious settlement. In stark cont rast to the inquisitional 
polici es of Catholic Spain, the 1559 Act of Uniformity requir ed only out-
ward co nformity to Protestantism. Thi s prioritization of phenomena over 
essence, actions over belief, simp lified the matt er of relig ious regulation 
significantly, but it a lso created a distinct epistemo logical prob lem: how 
can one know what others trul y believed if outsides, acts, are all th at 
is policed? 21 Silence-the absence of exte rnall y manif ested evidence-
becomes pa rticularly vexing in this co ntex t. George Wither exploit s this 
anxiety in his emb lem, "In Silentio et Spe." The image dep icts a friar hold -
ing a clos ed book in one hand and an anchor in the other. Th e lines below 
the image read: 
Th e clasped-Booke, doth warne thee, to retaine 
Th y thought s within the compasse of thy breast; 
And, in a quiet silence to remaine, 
Until!, th y minde may safe ly be expres t . 
That Anchor, doth inform e the e, that thou must 
Walke on in Hope; and, in th y Pilgrimage, 
Beare up (w ithout despairing or distrust) 
Those wrongs, and sufferings, which atte nd thin e Age. 
Hee, that then keeps his Tongu e, ma y keepe his Life, 
Till Times will better favour Inn oce nce. 
Truth spoken w here untruth is more approved, 
Wil l but enrage the mali ce of thy foes.22 
In Wither's poem, ideas, thoughts, an d beliefs constitute a form of 
cr iminality in and of th emselves, and the figure of the friar casts this 
crimin ality as specifically Catho lic. While silence and stasis a re associa ted 
with patience, strength, and hop e-a form of well-advis ed withdrawa l 
from a dan ger ous {Protest ant) wor ld-it a lso offers a way of arming one-
self for confrontation wit h th at wor ld . It represents the surest means of 
surviva l in a rime when " untruth is more approved" than truth. 
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More complex forms of deception allowed Catho lics to remain silent 
on the question of their faith even whi le appearing to address it. Th e do c-
trine of equivocation, for example, urged Catholics under the thr eat of 
recusancy laws to profess adherence to Protestantism in language which, 
while not constitut ing an outright lie, was vague enough to accommod ate 
the sentiment opposite to that ostensibly being expressed. The opposite 
sentiment ("I am a devout Catho lic") would be the one held inward ly 
and the one known to God. 23 Equ ivocation was an especially challeng-
ing form of subterfuge because it was, paradoxically, a speaking secret. It 
achieved the effects of silence through the mechanics of language and, in 
this way, preserv ed the mind as a haven for subversive ideas. 
At the turn of the seventeenth century, equivocation was increasin gly 
being correlat ed to the crime of treason. Christopher Bagshaw and Wil-
liam Watson, both of whom were themselves Catholics, joined a choru s of 
like-minded criticism when they condemned equivocation as "secret co n-
cealed treason." 24 Such appraisals were validated by the series of events 
that followed the unsucce ssful Gunpowder Plot, a conspiracy aimed at 
killing King James, his family, and a large number of Protestant aristo -
crats by blowin g up the H ouses of Par liament while in session . A search 
of the chamb ers of one of the chief conspirators, Francis Tresham, turn ed 
up a copy of A Treatise of Equivocation (1598 ) by the Jesuit Henry Gar-
net in which he upheld the legitimacy and utility of the practice. 25 Thi s, 
predictably, led to equivocat ion's immediate disrepute and its entrench ed 
association with the treason ous imagination. During the conspirat o rs' 
t ria ls, Coke, then the attorney general, condemned " perjurious Equiv o-
cating'' and Garnet's treatise in particular as "a very labyrinth to lead 
men into error and falsehood" by persuading them not only "to conceale 
or denie an open trueth, but Religiously to averre, to prot est upon sa l-
vation, to sweare that which themselves know to be most false, and all 
this by reserving a secret and private sense inwardly to themselv es."2v 
Th e mandaror y oaths of allegiance that King James instated in 1606 and 
1610, largely as a response to the Gunpowder Plot, were design ed to lay 
bare the workings of subjects' minds by forcing them not only to swea r 
loyalty to the king, but a lso to swear that they were doing so un equiv o-
cally.27 Measur es like these were only partially successful. Ther e were 
always new ways to dissimulate. And there was also the advice proff ered 
in Wither's em blem: silence . Many simply refused t0 tak e the oaths. 2~ 
On one hand, a combination of legislative intervention and politi cal 
anxiety made the inner world of thoughts a very real location for tr easo n. 
On the other, the indisp utab le kn ow ledge tha t thoughts are only int elli-
gible by way of a material trace made the inter iorize d account o f treaso n 
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theoretica lly and procedurally thorny. During Nichola s Throckmorron's 
1554 treason trial for allegedly "co mpassing" to depr ive the queen of 
her crown, the accused lash ed out, "Where doth appear the open deed of 
any compassing or imaginin g the Que en's death?" 29 The trial of H enry 
Cuffe features similar wrang ling over the definit ion of treaso n. Henry 
Cuffe was secretary to Robert Devere ux , second Earl of Essex, and was 
executed along with him after a failed insurrection against the queen in 
1601. Cuffe played no active role in the rebellion. The secretary was in 
his stud y reading when Essex and his followers marched on London . But 
in the aftermath of the botched insurrection, Cuffe was accu sed of fail-
ing to prevent a conspiracy he had full knowledg e of .10 As thi s suggests, 
the conviction of Henry Cuffe dep end ed on the prosecutor s' ability to 
deploy successful ly a version of trea so n that was neither linguistically 
nor physically inscribed. Cuffe's defense, however , was firmly rooted in 
an a lternativ e notion of trea son as action. As far as he was conc erned , 
since he was not present at the attempted insurrection, he was not cul-
pabl e. Th e mind, for Cuffe, was po liceable on ly by God, not the sovereign 
and not the sovereign's judges. The thoughts that were running through 
Cuffe's head on the day of the insu rrection as he was sitting quietly in 
Essex Hou se readin g were, in his own words, "no more treaso n than the 
chi ld in a mother 's belly is a child." 31 Solicitor General Thomas Flemin g 
saw thin gs differently. Even if Cuffe had not acco mpanied Essex on the 
day of the rebellion, he appeared to have been intellectually comp licit 
with the republican polit ical ideas that bo lstered Essex's ill-fa ted plan. 
Th e fact that he remain ed silent and inactive at Essex Hou se whil e all 
of thi s was going on was tak en as proof of thi s comp licity. Accordingly, 
Fleming arg ued , Cuffe was gui lty not for act ing out against the queen, 
but for "compassing the qu een's Destru ction ." This, be maintain ed , was 
"Treason in the very thought and cogitation." 32 Cuffe maintained his 
innoc ence unti l the very end . In a scaffo ld speech that came to be widely 
disseminated in print and manuscript , he declar ed defiantly, " I do her e 
call God, bis angels, and my own conscience to witness, that I was not 
the leas t concerned ther ein, but was shut up that whole day within the 
house , where l spent the time in very melancholy reflect ions"; " I am here 
adjudg ed to die for plottin g a plott never acted rand! for acting an act 
never plotted." 33 
Over the course of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuri es, 
treaso n in theo ry moved deeper into the unseen world of thought and 
knowled ge. In practice, how ever, physical acts and material things proved 
very difficult to excise from the crime's overall conceptua l structure. Con -
viction frequ entl y required concrete evidence, some trace of subversion's 
Criminality 89 
appearance in the world, and even when this evidence was not requir ed, 
wh en silence and withdrawal seemed to be grounds enough for conviction, 
records show that the accused still demanded it. By the time Shakesp ea re 
wrote Macbeth in 1606, treason had a peculiar mixture of association s. 
On one hand, it called to mind sensational forms of action : Essex and his 
men marching on London in 1601; Catholic conspirators almost blowin g 
up the House of Lords in 1605. On the other hand, treason was firmly 
linked to the imagination, to ideas that were fundamentally incompatibl e 
with social and political order. As such, early modern treason raises in 
historically specific terms theoretical questions about criminality mor e 
generally. When does a crime begin? At what point are we culpabl e? 
What counts as evidence? When we start posing questions like thes e, 
we're not just talking about law anymore . Also at issue is the natur e of 
the relationship between thinking and doing. Answering the question s 
involves assumptions about how the body and mind interact, the differ-
ence between an idea and an intention, and the degree to which thought s 
both shape and get shaped by the materia l world. The dagger scene in 
Macbeth takes up this cluster of questions and in doing so it function s as 
both an imaginative response to the legal culture of treason and a the atri -
cal experiment in trans lating the performance of political disobedi ence 
into the performance of selfhood. 
T he Phenome nology of Treas on 
Macbeth teaches us not only that power corrupts, but also that knowl -
edge corrupts: bad thoughts lead to bad deeds. The murder of Dun ca n 
finds its source in Macbeth's acquisition of untimely knowledge from the 
witches: "All hail, Macbeth, that shalt be King hereafter" (1.3.50). And 
wh en he hisses despairingly to Lady Macbeth, "O, full of scorpions is 
my mind, dear wife!" (3.2.36), he is referr ing not only to the guilt and 
paranoia that have seized hold of him since the murder, but also to tho se 
corrupting seeds of knowl edge from which his ma lice (first toward Dun -
can and now toward Banquo and Fleance) originally sprung . In these 
examples, there is a certain sequential distance between know ledge or 
thought and the act they lead to. In other p laces, thinking and doin g 
are more proximate and lack a clearly causal relationship. Early on in 
the play, for example, Macbeth speaks of his "thought, whose murth er 
yet is but fantastica l" (1.3.139). The reference is not to the murd er of a 
thought, but instead to a thought that will itself do the murdering . It's a 
strange turn of phra se which exte nds the murd erou s thought beyond the 
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technical parameters of mens rea. Instead , ''thought" marks the collapse 
of mens rea and actus reus into one another, something we see again lat er 
in the play when Macbeth describes his machinations as "young in deed" 
(3.4.143). Macb eth means that plans are being thought up but have yet 
to be executed . But to describe thoughts as "young in deed" puts particu-
lar em phasis on the way thinking can be viewed as part of the larger life 
cycle of doing, rather than as something substantially or ontologically 
distinct. To broach the idea from the other direction, deeds according to 
the logic of this phrase are things that hav e thoughts folded into them as 
a constituent substance . These dist inctions may be subt le, but in a play as 
grimly fascinated as Macbeth is with both the sources and cons equenc es 
of thought, they become touch sto nes of a larger thematic concern, one 
that is attended to with particu lar rigor in th e dagger scene. 
Towards the end of act 2.1, we find Macbeth alone on stage. H isser -
vant has gone ro bed; so has Banquo. Left by himself to pond er for a 
moment the crime he is about to commit, Macbe th stares intent ly into 
empty space and says the follow ing: 
Is this a da gger which I see before me , 
The handle toward my hand? Co me, let me clur ch thee: 
I have thee not, and yet I see thee still. 
Art thou nor, fatal vision, sensible 
To feeling as to sight? o r art thou but 
A dagger of the mind, a false creation, 
Proceeding from the heat -oppre ssed br ain? 
I see thee yet, in form as palpab le 
As this which now I draw. (2.L33 -41 ) 
There has been a tendency in criticism devoted to Macbeth to view this 
speech as a moment during which some form of interiority is disclosed : 
"t he growth of evil in the mind ,"3~ ''the divided so ul,"35 or "the function-
ing of conscience," 36 to give a few examp les. Were we to put this in legal 
terms, we might call it a performance of mens rea or what the Edwardian 
statute calls "compass[ ing]" treason. But this is only part of the picture. If 
we focus too narrow ly on the idea of interiority we risk obviating what, in 
my view, makes the speech unique and intellectua lly potent: its complex 
marshaling of mind and matter. Rather than simply staging int er iority, the 
dagger scene treats the process of becoming crimina l in a way that makes 
physical sensation integral to menta l concept ion.37 The initial question 
that Macbeth poses-"ls this a dagger which I see before me, I The han -
dle toward my hand? "- has to do not only with what at that moment 
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Macbeth knows, but also, as we quickly discover, with how he know s it: 
through vision ("see") and through touch ("Come, let me clutch thee"). 38 
These lines describe knowledge and thought as part of a larger sensua I 
experience that extends beyond the mental or spiritua l into a real, mate-
rial world of things and actions. This is not to say that Macbeth does 
not think himself into the criminal event, but rather that the thinking he 
does he do es at least in part with his body. Knowledge - the treasonou s 
imagination, in this case-requir es a physical extension outward, which 
means the kernel of thought is not mental activity per se but the objects 
and environments that generat e that mental activity when perceiv ed by 
the senses. Thinking exceeds the boundaries of the purely physical or 
pure ly mental since it entails an act of quasi-physical mental acquisition, 
one which in this soli loquy is litera lized when Macbeth reaches out for 
the mental dagger, eventually replacing it with his own real dagger. 
What we see in the dagger scene, then, is not so much criminal intent 
as it is something we might call criminal intentionality. Criminal intent-
the premeditation of a murder, for example - refers to something ment al. 
And though it also presupposes a will toward an action in the objec -
tive world outsid e, it still designates the mental inception of that act as 
chronologically pr ior to its materia lized performance and, to that extent , 
as separate from it. As Jonathan Gil Harris reminds us, chronological 
thinking is "a practice [that] works to separate time into a linear ser ies 
of units ... each of which is partitioned from what precedes and follows 
it." 39 Intentionality, on the oth er hand, is a phenomenological conc ept 
that mode ls mind -body relations in a rather different way. 40 In Edmund 
Husserl's formulation, the doctrine of intentionality states that every act 
of consciousness, every thought, is directed toward an object of some 
sort. That is to say, consciousness is a lways consciousness of something: 
the thought and the thing are never readi ly separable. 41 Indeed , the 
thing- what Huss erl wou ld call an "intentional object," or noema 42-
creates the thought, creates the very conditions of sentience; not the other 
way around . In Macbeth's soliloquy, the dagger takes on the role of the 
intentional ob ject. It catalyzes Macbeth's consciousness of his own crimi-
nality and at the same time teeters playfu lly on the frontier betw een idea 
and object. 43 Treason is not anchored to a founding moment of cogito 
in this scene. Instead, it should be viewed as evolving out of so mething 
Tim Bayne calls "agentive experience," a distributed and dynami c process 
involving both thinking and feeling, imagination and action. 44 
In Heidegger' s version of phenomenology, this intentional approac h 
to thought meant that all being, a ll consciousness, must be und erstoo d 
as being-in-the-world (ln-der-Welt-sein), in a world "o ut there" rath er 
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than "in here." 45 Simi larly, Hannah Arendt, in her phenomenologica lly 
influenced study The Life of the Mind, sought to affirm the active, physio-
logical qua Ii ties of thought by insisting that th e mind is always "the mind 
of the make r of use -ob jects," "a toolmaker's mind ," "the mind of a body 
endowed with hands ." 46 M erlea u-Ponty took th e notion of ln-der -Welt-
sein one step further , declaring that "there is no inner man, man is in the 
wor ld, and on ly in the world does he know himself." 47 Merleau -Ponty's 
focus, especia lly in The Phenomenology of Perception, is on the way our 
senses gather information from a reality that is "always 'alr ea dy ther e' 
before reflection begins. " 4H This, according to Merleau -Ponty , makes per -
ception the intentional act par exce llence. Rather than seeing the world 
and our actions in it as the products of ideas innat e within the mind , 
Merleau -Ponty argued that we can on ly conceive what we first perceive, 
that thought is largely th e product of embodied expe rien ce of th e world .49 
"All knowledge, " he insists, "takes place within the hori zons opened up 
by perc eption." 50 
Merleau -Ponty 's arguments are semina l within the history of twenti eth-
century phenomenology and its critique of transcendental philosophy, 
but they also gesture back to similarly sense -oriented theori es of human 
cog nition within the Aristote lian tradition of philosophy, including Scho -
lasticism and neo -Scholasticism. Aristotle understood the sou l, or the 
mind, to be the domain not only of int ellectual powers, but also of veg-
etative and sensitive powers , including all forms of int erna l and externa l 
sensation, appet ite , and motion.- 11 Thomas Aquinas, following his lead, 
argued that all knowl edge and thought start with th e reception in the 
external sense organs of what he terms "sens ible species" tran smitted 
from th e sensible qualities in external objects.52 Thi s Thomastic mode l 
of cognition - precise ly th e model that Descartes 's dualistic philosophy 
sought to do away with - was maintain ed by lat er Scholastics in th e ear ly 
modern per iod, especially in Spain and ltaly .53 Ind eed, there is something 
cur ious ly premodern about M erleau-Ponty's sensua l account of thought 
and about th e conceptua l ma chinery of phenomeno logy, mo re generally. 
Merleau-Pon ty suggests as much when he describes the goa l of phenom-
enology as "re-achieving a d irect and primitive contact with th e world ." 54 
Rob ert Soko lowski has tra ce d some of this relationship in detai l, notin g 
for examp le th e "continuity betw een Thomistic thought and th e ea rly 
stages of phenomenology," the chief instance of this being the formida -
ble influence of Franz Bretano's neo -Scholastic phi losophy on Edmund 
Husser l. "Phenomenology, " according to Sokolowski, "brea ks out of 
modern ity and permits a restoration of the convictions that anima ted 
ancient and medieva l phi losophy." 55 
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This link between the modern and the premodern reminds us that it 's 
on ly in a very narrow sense that phenomenology can be considered a single 
school of thought. Although it did take the form of an actual philosophi ca l 
movement in the twentieth century-associated most notably with Hus -
serl, Heidegger, and Medeau-Ponty - phenomenology is not in th e first 
plac e a historically fixed set of doctrines. More accurately, it's a practi ce or 
a method, a way of descr ibing knowledge as embedded experience. Becau se 
this practice or method occurs in a variety of contexts, and because it can 
be used to pursue differen t kinds of philosophical and creative project s, 
phenomenology is most usefu lly thought of as an "intellectual diaspora, " 
a network of discrete theories and practices that share basic assumption s 
about the embodied and object -or iented nature of experience . Theater is 
very much part of this intellectual diaspora. 56 As I have argued elsewh ere 
with James Kearney, "phenomenology . .. has an affinity with theat er's 
attempt to stage for its audience minds and bodies and artifacts in dynami c 
relation ." Whether the goal is philosophical inquiry or entertainment, 
phenomenological description and theatrical dramatiza tion ... 
depend on a suspension or bracketing of the world of experience, 
a framing of the ob ject at hand, to see some aspect of that expe-
riential world in some sort of exaggera ted or reduced or clarified 
form .57 
This is the sense in which the performance of treason in Macbeth is phe -
nomeno logical. The dagger scene represents an attempt to suspend and 
frame the dynamic relationship between minds, bodies, and artifacts . ft 
tries to think slow something that typically gets glossed over or ignor ed : 
the way thoughts emerg e interactively from a larger sensory environment 
and th e way imagination funct ions as part of a material ecology that 
includes but a lso exceeds the individual body. 
With this in mind, consider the moment in the soliloquy when Mac-
beth experiences his most intense doubt about the existence of the dagger . 
The passage sets up a particularly close set of correspondences betwee n 
feeling, th inking, and doing: 
Mine eyes are made the fools o' th' other senses, 
Or else worth all the rest . I see thee still; 
And on thy blade and dudgeon gouts of blood , 
Which was not so before. There's no such thing: 
It is the bloody business which inform s 
Thus to mine eyes. (2.1.44 - 49) 
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Macbeth is intent on finding a position of lucidity, but it soon becomes 
apparent that while he can deny the objective existence of the dagger, he 
cannot deny his sensory exper ience of it: "I see thee sti ll," he confesses. 
Macbeth feels crim inal, and this perception of treason is not readily sepa-
rab le from his conception of the same. What's more, this economy of 
feeling and perceiving also sets the parameters for action in Macbeth's 
world. There is something temporally peculiar about the way the dagger 
is seen as deriving from the "bloody business." Wouldn't it be the ot her 
way around? Isn't the "b loody business," the actus reus of the future, 
a final destination, the outcome of Macbeth's reflection on the dagger? 
Macbeth doesn't see it this way, and for a simp le reason. The dagger 
already has "gouts of blood" on the "blade and dudgeon" (2.1.46). From 
his perspect ive, the dagger seems to be compelling him to do something 
that's already been done. This temporal convo lution produces a strange 
combination of effects: on the one hand, an uncanny sense of urgency, and 
on the other, an overwhe lming sense of inevitabi lity. Macbeth struggles 
to keep pace with his own actions. The material instantiation of murder, 
metonymized in the dagger, is always one step ahead of his thoughts of 
the same: "Thou marsha l'st me the way that I was going, I And such an 
instrument I was to use" (2.1.42-43 ). Yet the temporally eccentric way 
in which Shakespeare structures mind-body relations in this scene would 
look fam iliar to phenomenologists. As Husserl, Alfred Schutz, and others 
have posited, all acts must be thought of as a lready completed in order 
for them to be begun, with the result that ostensibly prospective action 
is always, on some level, exper ienced as retrospective. 18 This mode l of 
tempora l experience, what Husserl ca lls "internal t ime-consciousness," is 
a salient feature of the murder of Duncan and it 's a lso part of the larger 
thematic fabric of the play. The idea is signa led early on in Lady Mac-
beth's apt phrase, "T he future in the instant" (1.5 .58) .59 T he wor ld of 
Macbeth is one in which the force of what-is-to-come overwhelms what-
is-at-ha nd , establishing its moral and politica l horizons and placing sharp 
str ictures on what is possible in the realm of human action . It's a world 
in which the present is haunted by the future, not the past . The "gouts of 
blood" on the dagger serve this larger theme of untime liness and mode l 
an intentional form of consciousness where one thinks with things and 
makes plans for the past. 
Shakespeare's phenomeno logy of treason concedes that the crime 
invo lves knowledge, bur it insists that knowledge is always situated in 
a lived environment . Jr concedes that th e cr ime involves thinking, but it 
insists that one thinks with the body. This model of crimina lity occurs 
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elsewhere in the p lay, too, as when Macbeth decides to ambush Macduff's 
castle and murder his wife and children. He resolves that, 
From this moment 
The very firstlings of my heart shall be 
The firstlings of my hand . And even now, 
To crown thoughts with acts, be it thought and done: (4.1.146-49) 
What is arresting about this passage is the self-consciousness with which 
Macbeth adopts a phenomeno logical disposition and the pointedness 
with which his resolution denies thought-act chronology . This, Macbeth's 
third murderous undertaking (after Duncan and Banquo), is not thought 
then done; it's "thought and done." Thinking and doing are both, simul -
taneously, "firstlings"; one is of the heart, one is of the hand, but both are 
folded together into a single criminal event. 
For Lady Macbeth, too, heart and hand, mind and body, converge to 
form the phenomeno logica l cusp along which criminality structures itself. 
For her, the treasonous imagination, or "mortal thoughts" (l.5.41), can 
only be conceived of in embodied terms: 
Come, you spirits 
That tend on morta l thoughts, unsex me here, 
And fill me from the crown to the toe topfu l 
Of direst cruelty! Make thick my blood, 
Stop up th' access and passage to remorse, 
That no compunctious visitings of nature 
Shake my fell purpose, nor keep peace between 
Th' effect and it! (1.5.40-47) 
As Lady Macbeth directs herself with increasing determination toward 
the murder of Duncan, we do not witness criminal intent evolving in any 
conventional sense from her mind. Lady Macbeth's "mortal thoughts" 
are thoughts indeed, but far from being incorporeal abstractions, they 
are presented as concrete things that "fill" the body, "from the crown to 
the toe topful." Moreover, the movement from "mortal thoughts" to mor -
tal act is not expressed in dualistic or even sequential terms, with ideas 
passing across a threshold into the territory of bodily action . Instead, 
this movement between "fell purpose" and "Th' effect" is described as 
an integrated physiological episode involving the thickening of the blood 
and the closure of various bodily valves and passageways. 60 Think ing 
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remains an essentia l component of criminality in this passage, but it's 
imagined specifically as something that takes place in and through the 
body. In this respect, Lady Macbeth's dark ruminations lay the concep-
tual groundwork for the legal phenom enology that receives its fullest, 
and most sensational, treatment in the soliloquy of act 2.1. 
T heater, T heory, an d the Lega l Im agination 
We have seen that Shakespeare responds to questions about treason mad e 
ava ilab le to him through the lega l culture of his time, including key trials 
a nd legislat ion as well as major crimina l events like the Essex rebel lion 
and the Gunpowder Plot. We have also seen that Shakespeare approaches 
these questions from what wou ld now be described as a phenomeno logi-
cal perspective, especially in the dagger scene. The sequential process of 
thinking and doing, of mens rea and actus reus, is performed during this 
ep isode as a scene of seeing and feeling, one which, accordingly, advances 
an embedded mode l of selfhood at the same time as it speculates about 
the nature of the treasonous imagination. Keeping these observations in 
view, what I propos e in this section is that the dagger soliloquy shou ld 
be thou ght of as both an act of theater and an act of theory. Attending 
to the way thes e two practic es overlap can deepen our understanding of 
how Shakespeare uses the formal and materia l resources of performance 
to move from matters of law to matt ers of selfhood. 
Let me return one more tim e to that foundationa l question: "ls th is a 
dagg er which 1 see befor e me? " On on e hand, this is a quintess entially the-
atrical question. At once an object and a vector, the dagger describes the 
possibility of know ledge (''Is this a dagg er") in specifically visual and spa-
tial terms ("which I see before me"). At the same time, Macb eth is po sing 
a quintessentially theoretical question, one that assumes knowledge to be 
both conditional and experi ential, and which, as I noted at the beginning 
of the chapter, probes the relationship betw een certa inty and perception 
as well as intention and action. It 's th e act of seeing, signaled by the word 
"see" in the opening line, that binds thea ter and theory together concep-
tu a lly. Th e link is preserv ed etymo logically in the two words' common 
source, the Greek verb theaomai (to look ).6 1 T he Greek word for theat er, 
theatron, means literally, a place for viewing, and the first occurrence of 
the word ''thea tre" in English, in a Wycliffit e Bible manuscript of 1382, 
carries the gloss, a "commune biholdying place." 62 Simi larly , theory, from 
the Greek word theorein (a looking at, viewing, cont emp lation) origina lly 
meant "a sight," or "a spectacle." 63 To theoriz e was to observe int ense ly 
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the outward appearance of something. In the dagger soliloquy, Shake -
speare opens this space of overlap between theater and theory, where 
know ledge is assumed to be a product of seeing and where undetstandin g 
accrues from sensual, visual contact with the outward world of app ear-
ances, not from some ideal realm of forms beyond it . The moment of 
collective seeing- Macbeth's and the audience's-invoked wh en Mac-
beth asks, "Is this a dagger which I see before me," is also the point at 
which the play thinks most rigorously about the nature of criminality. 
Theater and theory, spectacle and speculation, vision and knowledg e, for 
a moment become a single entity. 
The idea of an equivalence between theater and theory-even th e idea 
that serious thinking could take collective and spectacular forms-will 
sound oxymoronic to some. It is, after all, antithetical to some of the most 
deeply entrenched assumptions of Western philosophy: that we should 
be suspicious of appearances, seek true knowledge behind the decepti ve 
veneer of surfaces, and cultivate wisdom and new ideas in isolation a nd 
through introspection. When the philosopher of science Michel Serres 
writes, "in an oral culture, drama is the vehicular form of know ledge/' 
the implication is that this knowledge, theatrical knowledge, is som ehow 
rudimentary, unevolved, or pre-philosophical. 64 William West explains 
that "the culture in which knowledge and spectacle are equal is alw;:iys 
represented as one that is alien to the definer: oral instead of litera te, 
' primitive' or decadent rather than modern." 65 The divorce between the-
ater and theory has been trac ed back to Plato by Jacques Taminiaux 
and Paul Kottman .66 Taminiaux describes the shift in ter ms of the dis-
placement of phronesis, a practical form of wisdom that assum es action 
to play an essential role in the acquisition of knowledge, by sophia, a n 
abstracted and ideal form of wisdom set in opposition to praxis and the 
operations of the body .67 While phronesis is easily accommodated by th e 
practice and experience of theater, sophia obvious ly is not . Tamini a ux 
sees the replacement of phronesis by sophia as a defining charact eris tic o f 
Plato's writings, arguing that "it is against the former theater-th e th eate r 
o f Aeschylus and Sophocles in which the average person was judg e-th at 
Plato ... [expels] the uncertain light and ambiguity of theatrical plots 
in order to gain access to another stage, no longer praxis but instead the 
onto -rheolog ical order of Ideas." 68 After Plato, "theory" begins to signify 
a new kind of seeing, one that takes place through the eyes of the so ul 
rather than the eyes of the body and which, therefore, carried a sense 
which would eventually be entrusted to Latin terms like contemplatio."~ 
/\ccordingly, Macbeth may be understood as being theoretical in a specifi-
cally pre-Platoni c sense, o r in the manner invok ed by Alain Badiou wh en 
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he argues that "t heater thinks. " 70 Macbeth is a play that engages in the 
work o f knowledge, the labor of thinking, as theatrical phronesis rather 
than as sophia. 
Plato is not th e only one to blame fo r th e conceptual ruptur e betw een 
theater and theory. Plotinus, for instance, viewed al l forms of activity, the-
ater includ ed, as merely deb ase d forms of contemp lat ion .7 1 Arisrotle, too, 
in both the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, differentiates between 
the contemp lative bios theoretikos and the active, practical bios politikos 
in such a way so as to make them wholly distin ct forms of life.72 Cicero 
and Seneca wou ld reinforce this distinction later in their own writings. 73 
As we move out of Greek philosophy into Rom a n thought an d beyond, 
the physi ca l seeing and materia l spectacle of theater drifts ever farther 
from the increas ingly abstracted, privileged, and specia lized seeing of 
theory. Th e story of this diverge nce reac hes its apex with Desca rtes. His 
famous comm entary on gaz ing down from a window onto a bu sy stree t 
in Meditations on First Philosophy care fully undermines the idea of phy s-
ical seeing as a form of kn ow ing and rejects by implication the theate r as 
a site of knowledge-making. Desca rtes ex plains, "w hen lookin g from a 
window and saying I see men who pass on the str eet, I really do not see 
them, but infer that what I see is men." "What," he asks, "do I see from 
the window but hat s and coats wh ich may cove r automatic machines? "74 
This kind of skepticism would prope l Europ e into th e age of modern 
science, where the gaze of Man is a lways insufficient and physical see-
ing never provides a reliab le path to knowled ge.75 Truth unfold s instead 
through a new kind of vision, once the onto-theological vision of phi loso-
phy, now the theoretical -instrum enta l gaze of mod ern science. Both leave 
sensual vision, spectacle, and above all, th erefo re, theat er on the far side 
of a wide rift that separates it from the sop hianic knowin g of theory . 
Shakespeare belongs to a differ ent int ellec tu a l genealogy. T he proc ess 
of crimina l beco ming perform ed in act 2.1 adva nces an interac tive and 
non hierarchical model of mind -body relations. The scene makes the space 
of actio n and collective seeing coextensive with the kind of proba t ive 
thinking and conjecture th at we now call th eory . The paradox of the con-
vention of soliloquy, a paradox that Shakespeare embr aces in ac t 2.1, is 
that while it a llows the audi ence to indulge in a fantasy of unm edia ted 
access to the workings of the mind, it is in the end always precise ly the 
opposite : language, gest ure, exteriority. 76 In the thea ter, thought is a mat e-
ria l artifact and to "com pass an d imagine the death of ... the king " on 
stage is to activate a collective sensory event , one organized aro und the 
transact iona l rhythms of appea ra nce and reco gnition. Such transactions 
are amo ng the theater's most basic mech anisms for meaning-making: 
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p lays place things in the audience's field of vision and meanin g is gener-
ated through their ability to identify and contextualize them. Andrew 
James Hartley descr ibes this dynamic as "a continuum of recogniti on ... 
crucially grounded in physical presence ." 77 In its commitment to exter ior -
ity, Shakespeare's thea trical practice in act 2.1 ant icipates philo sop hers 
like Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Arendt, each of wh om in 
their own way seeks to bring action, vision , sensation, and collectiv e 
physical experience back into the domain of the intellectual. Shake spea re 
also looks back to Pythagoras who offers something of an originary scene 
of theater-as-theory when he compares the life of a philosopher to so me-
one who goes to festivals not to compete for prizes or to sell ware s, but 
simply to watch. 78 
Pythagor as 's philosopher, as Arendt notes, is part of a collectiv e of 
spectarorsh ip and is "therefore quite un like the philosopher who begins 
his bios theoretikos by leaving the company of his fellow men." 79 The 
Pythagorean parable makes looking essential to thinking, binding tog et her 
the theor etical life and the thea trical life into a sing le activ ity. Thi.s co n-
ceptual proximity , preserv ed in ancient Greek words like theatron and 
theorein, persists in Renaissance humanist conceptions of knowled ge-
making and know ledge-management. In th e sixteenth century, th e Latin 
word theatrum could refer either to a place for viewing spectacles o r to 
a wide-ranging, encyclopedic book, so that by the time the Th eat re was 
built in London in 1576, its name evok ed works of scholarship like Pierre 
Boaistuau's Theatrum mundi (1561), Th eodor Zw inger's Theatrum vitae 
humanae (1566 ), and Abraham Ort elius's Theatrum orbis terrarum 
(1570). 80 The Th eater, like other London playhouses established after it, 
was not on ly a place of entertainment, it was also a learning envir onm ent 
where one could watch ideas and see thinking in action. Thomas Elyot 
draws on this conception of theater when in The Image of Governan ce 
(1541 ) he has his ideal educational facilities include not on ly a library 
shap ed like a theater, but also an actual theat er where peop le could "dis -
pute op enly ... some matt er of phi losophy." 81 West explains, "For Elyot, 
the areas of the theat er and the library are contiguous and complimen -
tary .... In fact, th e circu larity of the library and the vivid statu es and 
images with which it is decorated mark it as a kind of asymptomatic idea l 
for the theat er as a perfectly legible spectacle of knowledge. "82 
This is the tradition in which Shakespeare works - that of spectac ular 
knowledge, or theoret ical theater - when in Macbeth he uses the stage to 
art iculate a phenomenology of treason. To recognize thi s is not to turn 
Sha kespeare into a theo rist or a philosoph er per se. It's to see him for 
what he was, a man of the theate r, but to ga in a heightened sense of 
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what that means by insisting that theater itself, and perhaps especially 
Shakespeare's theater, is and always has been theoretical. Accordingly, 
the dagger scene in Macbeth is best understood as the product of a care-
fully managed encounter between a cultura lly specific set of questions 
about a particular kind of crime and the uniquely collective and embod-
ied form of thought that theater makes possible. The effect in the world 
of the play is a kind of conceptual dilation whereby treason comes to 
encompass a much broader set of ideas about the relationship between 
thinking and doing and the shared, material grounds of knowledge and 
action . We'll continue to think about these ideas- embodiment, co llectiv-
ity, theater-in the next chapter as we mov e from one side of the legal 
equation to the other-from criminality to judgment. In this new context, 
we ' ll discover that thinking in and through the outer world of people and 
things has implications beyond the realm of phenomena l experience; it 
also const itutes a distinct ethical orientation, one that locates the good in 
the socia l and psychic commons of collaborative discernm ent. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
~ 
Judgment : The Sociality of Law in 
Hamlet and The Winter's Tale 
In The Arte of Logicke, an English rhetorical manual from 1599, Thoma s 
Blundev ille makes a distinction between "invention" and "judgment." 
While "invention finds matter," Blundeville explains, judgment "frameth, 
disposeth, and reduceth the same into due forme of argument." 1 This for-
mulation derives from Roman rhetorical theory, which has deeper roots 
in Aristotle. Texts like Cicero's De inventione, the anonymous Rhetorica 
ad Herennium, and Quintilian's Institutio oratoria describe invention 
(inventio) as the skill of deciding which line of reasoning is most likely 
to strike a particula r audience as especia lly compelling. Judgment's rol e 
is to break that line of reasoning down into component parts and then 
arrange them in a sequence calculated to achieve maximum persuasive -
ness. 2 Judgment, in other words, turns ideas into arguments by lending 
them organ izational form . Along with invention, it was an essential com -
ponent of what Aristotle termed the genus iudiciale, the kind of speech 
typically found in the law courts. 3 In Shakespeare's time, anyone with 
a grammar school education was likely to have encountered rhetorical 
handbooks like De inventione, Rhetorica ad Herrenium, and lnstitutio 
oratoria, or vernacular manuals like Thomas Wilson's Art of Rhetoriqu e 
(1553), which drew on the Roman handbooks. 4 Accordingly, Blund eviJle's 
simple description of judgment would have sounded familiar to many 
early moderns . This includes Shakespeare, who would have been exposed 
to rhetorical texts as a student at the King's New School at Stratford -
upon-Avon .5 As Kathy Eden, Henry Turner, Lorna Hutson, Joel Altman , 
Quentin Skinner, and others have shown, playwrights regularly made use 
of their training in rhetoric and dia lectic when crafting speeches and plot s 
having to do with evidence, proof, or doubt .6 
Shakespeare's understanding of judgment may also have been shap ed 
in a more general way by changes in the culture and practice of law durin g 
IOI 
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